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5E D I TO R I A L  FO R EWO R D
Turkey and the European Union (EU) are under-
going a tremendous crisis in their relationship. On 
the one hand, the EU is now more than ever preoc-
cupied with internal challenges, ranging from the 
rise of Euroskepticism and nationalist tendencies 
among the population to questions regarding the 
future architecture of the buffeted supranational 
unit. Member states appear to be looking inward 
and increasingly unable to speak with a single voice 
on matters of common foreign and security policy, 
neighborhood policy, and enlargement. On the 
other hand, it has been often argued that Turkey has 
abandoned reforms in adhering to the EU’s political 
criteria, has shown tendencies of polarization in 
domestic politics, and has been in a state of perplexity 
in foreign relations. Today, the continuation of 
membership negotiations with Turkey is subject to 
debate in Brussels, Berlin, and Ankara. 
Germany’s stance toward Turkey seems to have a 
major impact on Turkey’s relations with the EU 
in general and on the EU’s perception of Turkey’s 
membership in particular. This proved true not only 
when Turkey was granted EU candidacy status and 
began accession negotiations but also throughout 
the slowdown in the membership process that has 
been witnessed in recent years. Germany’s prominent 
position in the EU, mainly due to its economic and 
political weight, is widely considered an important 
determinant of the characteristics, scope, and content 
of the EU’s enlargement policy. Therefore, throughout 
Turkey’s extended EU accession process Ankara has 
paid particular attention to the official German stance 
towards Turkish membership in the EU. 
Germany and Turkey are tied to each other through 
a unique variety of historical, economic, cultural, and 
societal linkages. For decades, Germany has not only 
been Turkey’s leading partner in trade but also the 
biggest foreign investor in the country. The number 
of German companies and Turkish companies with 
German capital operating in Turkey has risen to 
nearly 6,000, whereas Turkish companies have been 
increasingly involved in investments in Germany and 
setting up businesses in sectors of strategic impor-
tance for both countries. The two countries cooperate 
under the umbrella of various major international 
organizations including the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), G20, and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The 
initiation of the German-Turkish Strategic Dialogue 
Mechanism in 2013 and the recent announcement 
to hold regular intergovernmental consultations 
starting from 2016 indicate the intensity of political 
dialogue between Germany and Turkey. As far as 
societal ties are concerned, the presence of nearly 
three million people of Turkish origin residing 
in Germany adds an important dimension to the 
German-Turkish relation and brings issues related 
to migration and integration to the forefront of 
bilateral dialogue. It therefore appears necessary to 
take a closer look at different aspects and dimensions 
of bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey, 
and scrutinize the limits and potentials of Turkey 
as an economic, foreign, and security policy partner 
for both Germany and the EU, taking into account 
global and regional challenges as well as the visions 
discussed in both Germany and Turkey regarding the 
future shape of Europe.
Officially, accession negations are proceeding. But 
amongst Turks, initial EU-euphoria has given way 
to disenchantment, and in Europe the enlargement 
fatigue seems to superimpose every debate on further 
enlargement. Therefore, it appears advisable not only 
to scrutinize the current status quo in the EU-Turkish 
dialogue but also to modernize various dimensions 
of this bilateral relationship framework to ensure a 
harmonious partnership. With its aggregate capabili-
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ties and position within the Union, Germany can play 
a major role in this process. But with one precondi-
tion: Germany’s interests and preferences should be 
taken into account. 
Against this background, this publication brings 
together analyses of preeminent scholars and experts 
who have specialized in different aspects of the EU/
German-Turkish dialogue with the aim of devel-
oping a critical and holistic approach to the study of 
German preferences pertaining to Turkey’s relations 
with the EU.
Ahmet Evin argues that despite close and deep-rooted 
bilateral relations, lack of a deeper understanding 
between Turkey and Germany exists. Against this back-
ground, Evin sheds light on various factors that affect 
Turkey’s complex and multi-dimensional dialogue with 
Germany and the formation of Germany’s preferences 
and policies vis-à-vis Turkey. 
Scrutinizing the nature of crises faced by Turkey 
and the EU, Werner Weidenfeld and Ludwig Schulz 
contribute their comparative insight into the external 
and internal challenges Turkey and the EU are 
confronted with. Both authors plead for a solution-
oriented common partnership dialogue between 
Turkey and the EU as an alternative to collective 
despair. 
Emre Hatipoğlu argues that a thorough under-
standing of Turkey’s diverse foreign policy tools and 
the dynamics behind the construction of Turkish 
foreign policy are key to defining the limits and scope 
of Turkey-EU cooperation with respect to foreign 
policy. Hatipoğlu claims that Turkey’s “soft” foreign 
policy tools make the country a natural partner for 
the EU’s new security concept that emphasizes fast 
response and civilian capacity building. 
Michael Nowak highlights the interests Germany 
and Turkey share with regard to foreign policy issues. 
Turkey’s specific role as an anchor for stability and 
its capacity to become a model of democracy for a 
region in conflict make the country an indispensable 
partner for both Germany and Europe. The contribu-
tion highlights cooperation opportunities in three 
pivotal regions. 
Ebru Turhan’s article draws attention to the asym-
metrical development of political and economic rela-
tions between Turkey and the EU/Germany. While 
Turkey’s political integration into the EU has slowed 
down over the past few years, economic cooperation 
has continued without significant drawbacks. Turhan 
warns of the negative consequences of this asym-
metry for both parties. 
Kerem Öktem discusses the key principles and goals 
of Turkey’s diaspora policies and draws attention to 
the challenges posed to the German political elite 
by the (partial) integration of Germany’s Turks 
into Turkey’s political space. Öktem argues that the 
modernization of legal and societal conditions in 
Germany is likely to minimize the counter-produc-
tive effects of the diaspora policies. 
Yaşar Aydın’s contribution examines the leading 
motives behind the Turkish government’s diaspora 
policy. Aydın argues that Ankara pursues its diaspora 
policy in order to realize reasonable political goals 
such as Turkey’s EU membership. However, the 
author claims also that Turkey’s diaspora policy 
holds the danger of increasing cultural and ethnic 
fragmentation among Germany’s Turks. 
Günter Seufert relates the shift in Turkey’s foreign 
policy in the era of Ahmet Davutoğlu to irreversible 
caesuras in the country’s social structure and political 
system, which partly explains the secondary or even 
tertiary significance the EU holds for Turkey today. 
Providing a sober assessment, Seufert claims that the 
EU, despite Ankara’s initial glance toward its wider 
neighborhood in its new foreign policy discourse, 
must be able to handle its relationship with a more 
Muslim conservative Turkey.
Ebru Turhan & Günter Seufert, November 2015
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How well are German interests understood in 
Turkey? That is the first question that comes to 
mind in considering how German interests might 
affect bilateral relations between the two countries. 
Although more than 50 years have elapsed since the 
1961 Turkish-(West) German labor recruitment 
agreement and although, as a result, there are now 
over three million persons of Turkish nationality 
or origin living in the Federal Republic, it cannot 
be said that Turks and Germans have developed a 
great deal of familiarity with one another. Neither 
Germany nor German values and culture are well 
understood in Turkey nor is Turkey, its society 
and culture well known in Germany. The lack of a 
deeper understanding between the two sides is all 
the more baffling considering the fact that Germany 
is Turkey’s leading trade partner and the leading 
source of its foreign direct investment.
Despite close economic relations between the two 
countries and a significant Turkish presence in 
Germany, the perception of either side of the other 
still remains influenced by stereotypes and miscon-
ceptions ingrained in the popular imagination. 
Inasmuch as the early modern image of the terrible 
Turk did not totally vacate the German imagination, 
so, too, that of the somewhat xenophobic, robotic 
German in uniform continued to be implanted in 
the Turkish mind. These formidable prejudices 
have stood in the way of obtaining a clear perspec-
tive on one side of the other.
The value of such debates as captured in this policy 
report is obvious, given the urgent need for a sober 
assessment of complex regional and global devel-
opments that affects both Germany and Turkey 
as well as their relationship with each other. The 
EU triangulation further adds to the challenge, 
given the long history of Turkey’s volatile relations 
with the European entity and Germany’s less than 
sanguine views of Turkey’s EU membership.
Although the German government, unlike the 
French one, never single-handedly blocked any 
negotiation chapter, Germany’s ruling Christian 
Democrat party rejects Turkey’s full membership 
and proposed an undefined “privileged relation-
ship” between Turkey and the EU. This policy met 
with a stiff rebuff from the Turkish government. 
Although Ankara’s official position has not changed 
with respect to this matter, a de facto special rela-
tionship has gradually evolved between the EU 
(particularly Germany) and Turkey in the wake of 
a decline of support in Turkey of EU membership. 
Concomitantly, Turkey began to focus attention on 
its own neighborhood with a view to increasing its 
regional influence. Its fast economic growth and 
its penetration of new markets in developing coun-
tries lent credence to its enhanced regional role. 
Ankara’s priority of becoming the regional power 
was seen as an opportunity by its EU allies (as well 
as the United States) to enhance cooperation with 
Turkey in the Balkans and the Middle East. Europe, 
it appears, failed to discern the hubris behind 
Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions but considered 
Turkey’s engagement with this neighborhood a 
significant contribution towards helping to project 
the EU’s soft power onto the region. Then foreign 
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s thesis, Strategic Depth, 
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which had been adopted as the governing principle 
of Turkish foreign policy, emphasized, among other 
points, how Turkey’s historic familiarity with the 
neighborhood makes the country almost naturally 
the leading actor in the entire region that the Otto-
mans once ruled.
This is a tall order. It is understandable that Turkey’s 
affinity with the region would enable it to establish 
better rapport with the neighboring countries then 
major EU powers. Indeed, Turkey’s assistance 
programs in the Balkans and Afghanistan have 
been more successful, as discussed in this volume, 
then heavy-handed EU interventions that aimed 
to improve institutions rather than the condi-
tions on the ground. However, what is not taken 
into consideration by an overwhelming majority 
of European (and American) policymakers and 
political observers was the fact that, in the eyes 
of its non-Turkish subjects, the Ottoman Empire 
was not so different from the colonial powers of 
Europe and that they did not have particularly fond 
memories of the Ottoman rule. As Ankara adopted 
increasingly sectarian policies, it lost its credibility 
as an effective mediator and put itself in a position 
of being drawn into regional conflicts.
The Candidesque optimism with which then foreign 
minister Davutoğlu’s principle of “zero problems 
with neighbors” was received in all Western capitals 
gradually evaporated. The difficulty of sustaining 
amicable relations with all actors in a Hobbesian 
neighborhood should have been obvious from the 
beginning. With its regional policy in shambles, 
Turkey now is party to several conflicts in its imme-
diate neighborhood. Its security policies mean-
while seem to be bafflingly contradictory, partially 
in line with and partially contradictory to those of 
the EU and United States. Even if Ankara recently 
decided to allow Washington to use Turkish air 
bases to attack the so-called Islamic State in Syria 
and the Levant (ISIL), the Turkish government 
does not seem to be pursuing the fight against ISIL 
vigorously or to be anxious to find opportunities for 
security cooperation in the region with Germany or 
other EU member states.
On the other hand, economic cooperation between 
Germany and Turkey, as cited in this volume, is 
strong and is likely to remain so. Turkey has become 
a significant regional production base for German 
industries; German goods are favored by the 
increasingly affluent Turkish consumers. German 
foreign direct investment in Turkey has been 
running high since Turkey’s entry into a customs 
union with the EU (1996) and has accelerated 
since its official EU candidacy three years later. 
In Germany, increasing numbers of expatriate 
Turks and Germans of Turkish origin have joined 
the ranks of the Mittelstand. Expanding economic 
opportunities in Turkey over the past decade have 
reversed the pattern of migration with more Turks 
returning from Germany to work in Turkey than the 
other way round. 
The large Turkish community in Germany has 
served both to reinforce bilateral relations and, at 
the same time, to create tensions not only between 
the two countries but also within Germany. The 
question of integration has been a key factor that 
sharpens German perceptions toward the Turkish 
community and, by extension, toward Turkey 
itself. Perceptions, however, widely differ. Those 
who get to meet well-adapted and well-integrated 
members of the Turkish community develop posi-
tive or, at least, neutral attitudes toward Turkish 
presence in Germany. High visibility of those who 
resist integrating into the German society, on the 
other hand, significantly detracts from a positive 
attitude toward immigrant groups, particularly 
those from Turkey. High unemployment among 
school dropouts of Turkish descent and rising 
violence, as a result, in immigrant ghettos present a 
disturbing picture. Those who resist integration on 
religious/ideological grounds present an even more 
damaging picture, since they are associated with 
9Islamic radicals on account of their appearance. 
They also constitute the most strikingly visible 
Muslim group and, as such, reinforce perceptions 
of the vast difference between Muslim immigrant 
groups and European society— by extension raising 
further doubts in Germany about Turkey’s Euro-
pean credentials. 
The German perception of the Turkish govern-
ment’s diaspora policies, also discussed in this 
volume, are likely to detract from the Turkish 
community’s integration into the German milieu. 
Successive Turkish governments have maintained 
direct contact with expatriate communities abroad, 
providing these communities with teachers and 
religious officials whose educational background 
did not necessarily conform to the host country’s 
standards. Since the establishment of the Presi-
dency for Turks Abroad in the Prime Ministry, the 
Turkish government has intensified its efforts 
not only to keep in close touch and directly 
communication with the expatriate community 
but also to extend the effects of the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs across Europe. Moreover, Turkish 
political leaders’ election campaigning conducted 
on German soil is often viewed uncomfortably as 
Ankara’s effort to extend its tutelage over the entire 
expatriate Turkish community.
A cursory glance, such as the foregoing, at some of 
the topics covered in this policy report reveals the 
depth and complexity of Turkey’s relations with 
Germany. Those relations also demonstrate para-
doxical and even contradictory features. The two 
countries share a great deal in terms of economic 
interests both within the EU context and in respect 
to Turkey’s broader neighborhood. Their overlap-
ping interests are reinforced by the emphasis both 
countries place on trade. Germany, moreover, is the 
most crucial actor, which has the weight to influ-
ence the EU’s relationship with Turkey. It would 
not be realistic, however, to expect any progress in 
the foreseeable future in Turkey’s EU negotiations. 
This is so not only because of Germany’s reluctance 
to imagine Turkey as a member of the Union, as is 
often not all together correctly claimed, but also 
because of Ankara’s growing indifference to the EU. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish tendency to put domestic 
issues before foreign relations continues to detract 
from an accurate understanding of German inter-
ests and policies. 
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PARTNERSHIP BY CRISIS – A STRATEGIC OUTLOOK FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN FUTURE 
Werner Weidenfeld & Ludwig Schulz
For some years now, both Turkey and the European 
Union have been experiencing a period of profound 
crisis and substantial change. For Turkey,1 first 
the so-called “Arab Spring” had quickly turned its 
southern neighborhood into chaos, with repercus-
sions on Turkey’s own security, economy, and 
societal balance being felt almost daily on the streets. 
Then, all of the sudden, the events of 2013 at “Gezi 
Park” and on “December 17” had deeply shaken 
the country’s relative political stability, while the 
state’s reaction has since contributed intensively 
to an increase in political and social polarization. 
Furthermore, the Turkish economy continues to face 
ongoing structural deficits, enormous ups and downs 
in the currency, growing inflation and unemploy-
ment, and much uncertainty in domestic and inter-
national business circles concerning the country’s 
prospective stability. And, last but not least, Turkish 
policymakers have been undergoing a series of elec-
tions, which both the ruling party and the opposition 
have marked as decisive for Turkey’s future. Thus, 
in the fierce election campaigns that have actually 
been ongoing since 2013, polarization within Turkish 
society has escalated, and fears about the future of 
Turkey’s liberal democracy have spread widely.
In contrast to expectations and claims made by poli-
cymakers and opinion-shapers who predicted that 
after the 2015 parliamentary elections the country 
will be heading into calmer waters again, this state 
of crisis will continue for three main reasons. First, 
1 E. Fuat Keyman, “The AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and 
Polarization,” Insight Turkey 16, no.2 (2014): 19-31; Subidey Toğan, 
Ömer Gençkaya, Ludwig Schulz, and Roy Karadağ, Sustainable Gover-
nance Indicators: 2015 Turkey Report, (Bertlesmann Stiftung: Güter-
sloh, 2015).
polarization in Turkey’s domestic political scene will 
continue mainly due to the Justice and Development 
Party’s dominating, majoritarian, and conservative 
policies and discourses, which trigger harsh reac-
tions from opposition forces inside and outside of the 
parliament; the incumbent president’s rigid attitude 
toward many issues in public affairs, especially with 
regard to his unburied and highly controversial inten-
tion to turn “New Turkey’s” political system into a 
presidential one; and the important, yet highly fragile 
reconciliation process of the state with the country’s 
Kurdish minority. Second, the economic outlook 
still raises concerns as to whether Turkey will meet 
the necessary conditions for sustainable economic 
growth and employment, and thus, societal satisfac-
tion. And third, there is no clear prospect that Turkey 
will be able to return to its pro-active, stability and 
progress oriented foreign policy given the distressing 
political trends of growing instability, insecurity, and 
untamed conflict in the regional surrounding. Conse-
quently, Turkey’s state of crisis is not over.
For Europe, the situation remains critical, too.2 
Although in 2014 the EU electorate chose new lead-
ership that optimistically and more explicitly stresses 
that the Union has been overcoming its financial and 
economic crisis, a closer look reveals that there are 
still profound problems and challenges that Euro-
pean policymakers have so far failed to effectively 
address. Such problems are not only limited to the 
2 Werner Weidenfeld, “Europe in a state of crisis: the strategic perspec-
tives,” Journal of Global Policy and Governance 2, no.1 (2013): 79-83; 
see also various contributions in Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang 
Wessels (eds.), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration (Nomos Ver-
lag: Baden-Baden, 2014); Ahmet Evin and Megan Gisclon, The Liberal 
Order in Peril: The Future of the World Order with the West against the 
Rising Rest (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, 2015).
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vortex of public debt, economic slow-down, and 
unemployment but also a lack of necessary reforms in 
some major economies of the Union; an eastern and 
southern neighborhood in a state of political inse-
curity, social instability, and cultural disorientation; 
and a globalized environment in which rising powers 
in Asia and elsewhere tend to defy Western concerns 
and values while pursuing policies largely based on 
national interests, thus, exacerbating the potential 
and risk of global confrontation and conflict. 
Other indications of — although not necessarily the 
reasons for — the EU’s state of crisis are, first, the 
widespread disorientation in the EU integration and 
enlargement policies, which is most clearly seen in 
the increasingly complicated differentiation (or even 
fragmentation) of Europe into various clusters such 
as the “core group” of Euro and Schengen countries, 
a group of EU members that willingly and regularly 
“opt-out” of common policies, or the group of acces-
sion candidates, on the one hand, and random “neigh-
bors” on the other. Second, there is the widespread 
perplexity and reluctance of European policymakers 
to engage in dialogue and deliberate with the public 
on major issues of common concern, especially on 
the future of the European integration project. This 
is more obviously becoming an issue given the raising 
number of unsolved Europe-wide problems such as 
the Euro crisis, the refugee issue, and the question of 
how to ensure Europe’s socio-economic prosperity in 
the era of increasing global competition. Almost as a 
result of this comes, as a third indicator for Europe’s 
state of crisis, the rise of Euroskeptic social move-
ments within and beyond the EU. A growing number 
of nationalist and populist parties in “core” countries 
of the European integration process, such as France, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Austria or the Scandina-
vian countries, have gained ground in Europe’s public 
sphere by polarizing domestic politics at the expense 
of the idea of the common Europe. Their rise comes 
along with increasing extremism at the periphery, in 
countries such as Ukraine or Russia, or with regard 
to Muslim radicals in Northern Africa and the Middle 
East (and within Europe’s societies, too) who directly 
fight against the order and values of Europe.
As a result, the EU’s ongoing and deep-rooted crisis 
is multidimensional in terms of identity and orien-
tation, leadership and decision-making, as well as 
public legitimacy and institutional trust. The Union 
continues to show signs of structural weaknesses 
while merely paying lip service to its honorable, 
yet rarely practiced ideals, norms, and values, and 
lacking in visionary leadership, strategic culture, and 
an engaged public debate. Moreover, in this obvious 
state of crisis, the EU constantly sends negative and 
disappointing signals to countries in its eastern and 
southern neighborhood, which similar to the EU 
suffer from disorientation and instability as a result 
of authoritarianism, paternalism and nepotism, 
economic inefficiency, and a defective state of the 
rule of law and political participation. Thus, Europe’s 
image from the outside seems rather at odds with its 
own wishful thinking about itself.
Redefining Europe’s self and revitalizing the 
partnership with Turkey
Taking its perception of profound and widespread 
crisis for granted means that Europe must find an 
immediate and effective solution. In this decisive 
moment, Europe should try to redefine itself by 
returning to its core narrative – the institutionaliza-
tion of sustainable peace and prosperity under the 
commonly agreed conditions of secured freedom, 
equality, and justice. It is this narrative that must 
again be reinforced within Europe’s public and 
its official discourse. Europe must invest in smart 
power, develop a new vision of a common future, and 
draw up an ambitious working agenda for the decades 
to come. It must openly reemphasize its liberal 
democratic values and identify itself as a leading and 
inspiriting power in the age of globalization. It has to 
regain its power to inspire its own society, as well as 
those in its surrounding, if it wants to avoid disinte-
gration and a fall from grace. 
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In this urgent process of redefining Europe’s self, it 
is again likely that Russia, the Middle East and North 
Africa, as well as Turkey, will again serve as Europe’s 
“others” like they did in the past. Yet, in comparison, 
now more than ever Turkey plays a vital role as one 
of the EU’s oldest and most important partners.3 
Despite all justified doubts about the widely contro-
versial, crisis-ridden evolution of “New Turkey” 
and the still rather gloomy state of the European 
Union in general (and of the EU enlargement and 
neighborhood policy in particular), there is still so 
far no evidence that either Turkey or the EU and its 
members would unilaterally and ultimately break 
with Turkey’s accession process – simply because 
both are aware of their various interdependencies 
and the high potentials of their partnership in terms 
of politics and security, economy, trade and energy, as 
well as socio-cultural relations. Even a resumption of 
the accession talks may become reality in the future, 
especially if the Cyprus conflict draws closer to a 
solution as recent indicators from the island show. 
However, both parties have so far failed completely 
to meet the most crucial challenges of this process: to 
make Turkey’s democratization sustainable, to start 
preparing the EU for a future round of expansion, 
and to convince the EU public that the citizens of 
Turkey and other neighboring countries are accepted 
as active participants in the project to create the 
future Europe, i.e. to advance today’s “differenti-
ated” European integration.4 Compared to the past, 
when “othering” was used as a means to construct a 
3 See also Martti Ahtisaari et al., “An EU-Turkey reset,” Project-Syndi-
cate, March 13, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.project-syn-
dicate.org/commentary/eu-turkey-accession-talks-by-martti-ahti-
saari-et-al-2015-03.
4 On the latter, as a concept, see Bertelsmann Stiftung, The new Europe 
– Strategies for differentiated integration (Bertlesmann Foundation 
Publishers: Gütersloh, 1997); or, rather recently, see also Nicolai von 
Ondarza, Strengthening the core or splitting Europe? Prospects and pit-
falls of a strategy of differentiated integration (SWP Research Paper 2: 
Berlin, 2013). With regard to Turkey, see Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “The 
future of Europe, differentiated integration and Turkey’s role” (Rome: 
Global Turkey in Europe Commentary 9, 2013).
common European identity and to proceed with the 
integration process by excluding those who seem-
ingly did not fit into the “club,” this approach is no 
more logical or adequate to meet the needs of the 
Union today in times of globalization and increasing 
transnational interconnections. What is necessary 
instead is the creation of a strong, inclusive European 
narration in order to form a common identity, agency, 
and capability for joint action.5
A decisive moment for common strategic action
The word “crisis,” from its Greek root krísis, means 
“decision.” It should be understood less as a situation 
full of desperation than as a strategic moment in 
which “a decisive intervention can, and indeed must, 
be made.”6 Despite all widespread perplexity and 
pessimism about the current and continuing state 
of a deep-rooted and multidimensional crisis that 
Turkey and Europe find themselves in nowadays, 
acknowledging this state of crisis leads to a common 
horizon of perception and to the recognition of shared 
experiences. There is hope that through this, Turkey 
and the EU may join political and societal forces, and 
that challenges can be met and crisis can ultimately 
be overcome. Against this background, strategic 
thinking, deliberation, and action for a common 
future seem both feasible and urgent. Policymakers 
within and beyond the EU, thus including Turkey and 
other neighboring countries, should enter into open 
and mutually inspirational dialogue with each other 
and with intellectuals, multiplicators, and opinion-
shapers in their societies for the sake of Europe’s 
unity in diversity.
5 See also Gerard Delanty (ed.), Europe and Asia beyond East and West 
(Routledge: London/ New York, 2006).
6 Colin Hay, “Crisis and the structural transformation of the state: In-
terrogating the process of change,” British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 1, no.3 (1999): 317. Hay reconsiders the clas-
sical terminology of “crisis” developed by linguist Reinhart Koselleck 
(1988), who defines crisis as “a moment of objective contradiction, yet 
subjective intervention” (ibid., 323). 
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Many have contributed to the debate on whether 
continuity or change has marked the evolution 
of Turkish foreign policy during the last decade. 
However, this debate has often failed to distinguish 
between foreign policy aims and foreign policy tools. 
Such a conflation of concepts makes it difficult to 
identify the issue areas and where Turkey and the 
EU can cooperate with respect to foreign policy. If 
the two parties can manage to define common aims 
and coordinate their tools according to such aims 
in a partnership scheme, a number of cooperation 
opportunities exist. I also argue that a thorough 
understanding of the internal drives that have 
shaped Turkey’s foreign policy is key in identifying 
where and how Turkey and the EU can cooperate. 
These drives are: (1) the unipolar environment as a 
result of the end of Cold War; (2) Turkey’s increasing 
power; and, finally, (3) the popularization of foreign 
policy in Turkey’s domestic politics. 
Historically, the multifaceted alliance with Western 
powers forced Turkey to relinquish a substantial 
portion of its autonomy for formulating foreign 
policy. One illustrative consequence of opting 
for such a “mono-track foreign policy shaped by 
NATO’s preferences” was Turkey distancing itself 
from the Middle East. In return, Turkey was able 
to balance against revisionist demands of the Soviet 
Union.
As Turkey grew more capable and domestic 
concerns became more relevant, however, the Cold 
War conception of Turkey’s role as a mere container 
became obsolete. With the end of the Soviet threat, 
Turkey started exploring its options to shape the 
environment around it to its liking. The 1990s, 
however, marked a mismatch between Turkey’s 
aims and the tools it could afford. This mismatch 
was gradually addressed during the following 
decade.
To illustrate, Turkey has been trying to shape the 
political turmoil in many Arab countries, occasion-
ally taking unilateral action to change the status 
quo around it.7 Such domestic concerns especially 
manifested themselves in Turkey’s attitude towards 
the Syrian civil war, where the AKP government 
adopted a pro-Sunni sectarian foreign policy using 
overt and covert means to assist the Sunni rebels 
against the Assad regime. The Turkish govern-
ment has supplemented such efforts in the Arab 
countries with other tools of engagement such as 
mediation efforts, economic sanctions, and prefer-
ential trade schemes. That being said, Turkey has 
also repeatedly proved its commitment to NATO 
to maintain its security status quo, be it against an 
acute threat (as was the case with the stationing 
of the Patriot missiles in Southern Turkey against 
Syrian Scuds), or conventional threats.8 Turkey has 
also been maintaining the status quo on a number 
of issues, such as the Aegean issue and the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation initiative it revitalized 
about a decade ago.
Turkey has been trying to substantiate its foreign 
policy aims by resorting to an increasingly diverse 
portfolio of foreign policy tools. To illustrate, Turkey 
has been frequently issuing sanction threats and 
7 Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between ethics and self-in-
terest,” Insight Turkey 14, no. 1 (2012): 45-63. 
8 F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey’s New Geopolitics,” Survival 52, no. 2 
(2010): 157-180.
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sometimes carrying out these threats (e.g. Armenia, 
Syria). Turkey has also been investing in becoming 
a mediation hub in the region and has been occa-
sionally successful. Comparing Turkey’s successful 
mediation attempt in the Balkans, which resulted 
in the Istanbul Declaration, with the concomitant 
failure of the Prud/Butmir process illustrates 
that Turkey’s historical ties can add richness to an 
otherwise bureaucratized European foreign policy.9 
Foreign aid has become another forte of Turkish 
foreign policy. Turkey has become one of the larger 
donors of foreign aid, with its public aid reaching 
more than three billion USD in 2013, a figure that is 
roughly on par with those of Italy and Switzerland.
In addition to putting such emphasis on “soft” 
foreign policy tools intended to change the behavior 
of its partners, Turkey has also been transforming 
its military towards a change-seeking one. Parting 
with its status quo-seeking, manpower intensive 
military structure, Turkey has decided to invest 
in capital-intensive power projection capabilities, 
such as tanker planes, longer-range warships, and 
unmanned aerial vehicles. To illustrate, since 1980, 
the amount of military spending per personnel 
increased almost five times, from 4,200 to in excess 
of 20,000 constant USD. Such a transformation of 
Turkey’s military structure also makes Turkey a 
natural partner for the EU’s new security concept, 
which emphasizes fast response and civilian 
capacity building. Turkey’s civilian capacity 
building efforts in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle 
East, South Asia, and Afghanistan in particular over 
the last decade are especially of note.10 
The final point to be emphasized regarding Turkish 
foreign policy is the increasing connection between 
domestic politics and foreign policy. Turkish foreign 
9 Reina Zenelaj, Nimet Beriker and Emre Hatipoglu, forthcoming, “De-
terminants of Mediation Success in Post-Conflict Bosnia: A Focused 
Comparison,” Australian Journal of International Affairs.
10 Teri Murphy and Onur Sazak, Turkey’s Civilian Capacity in Post-Con-
flict Reconstruction (Istanbul Policy Center: Istanbul, 2012).
policy is increasingly responsive to domestic 
politics: water no longer stops at the water’s edge. 
Such domestic interest will inevitably translate 
into foreign policy commitments for the Turkish 
government, like the issue of Rohingya Muslims 
in Myanmar. As such, it is of utmost interest for 
EU officials to consider (i) whether they want to 
share the burden of their global commitments with 
Turkey, and if so, (ii) under what type of an institu-
tional structure the two partners can cooperate.
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T U R K E Y  A N D  G E R M A N Y:  J O I N T  FO R E I G N  P O L I C Y  I N T E R E ST S  A N D 
O P P O RT U N I T I E S  FO R  C O O P E R AT I O N  I N  T H E  R EG I O N
M i c h a e l  Nowa k
Preliminary note: The views expressed here are 
personal and do not necessarily reflect the official 
position of the Federal Foreign Office.
Turkey and Germany share many foreign policy 
interests. There is one reason for this convergence 
that may not come to mind immediately but is 
nonetheless fundamental: Both countries are 
particularly exposed to external markets. The 
McKinsey Global Institute’s Connectedness Index, 
which ranks 131 countries on total flows of goods, 
services, finance, people, data, and communica-
tion, shows that Germany is interlinked with the 
world more than any other country. Turkey, too, 
clearly has profited tremendously from globaliza-
tion, be it in the construction business or through 
companies with worldwide operations such as 
Turkish Airlines. Turkey’s foreign trade increased 
from 300 billion USD to 400 billion USD in the 
period between 2010 and 2014. Despite a recent 
slow-down, Turkey’s export industry remains 
strong. Many Turkish companies are globally 
competitive and keep looking for business oppor-
tunities beyond their immediate neighborhood. 
But companies prepared to take extra risks abroad 
also need a framework to operate in. The same 
applies for such agencies as TIKA or GIZ, Yunus 
Emre, or the Goethe-Institute.
As we are reminded daily, the existing world order 
is under attack, especially in the region—be it 
through the current geopolitical confrontation in 
Europe, the dissolution of state structures in the 
Middle East and Northern Africa, or the emergence 
of powerful and violent non-state actors. Stabiliza-
tion efforts and the promotion of universal norms 
and principles are more important now than ever.
One obvious way to serve these goals is strength-
ening Euro-Atlantic structures, first and foremost 
through cohesion within NATO. Turkey has proven 
its reliability as a NATO ally time and again. A 
particularly salient example was the decision taken 
in 2011 to participate in the missile defense program, 
despite great pressure from regional powers such 
as Iran. Germany for its part has shown solidarity 
by participating in the “Active Fence” mission, 
stationing patriot missiles in Kahramanmaraş since 
2013 to defend Turkish territory against possible 
attacks. Beyond NATO, there is a common interest 
in linking Turkey closer to the European Union. 
In this context, it is encouraging to see that in its 
2014 Transatlantic Trends Study, GMF found that 
53% of respondents in Turkey favored a European 
orientation of their country as opposed to only 45% 
the year before.
We, Germany, need Turkey, and Turkey needs us. 
As Fuat Keyman has put it, Turkey is an “indis-
pensable country.” For Germany and its European 
partners, it is of particular importance that Turkey 
be an anchor of stability in its neighborhood. The 
June 2015 parliamentary elections were a forceful 
demonstration that Turkey does have the capacity 
to be a model of democracy for a region in turmoil. 
Turkey can also exert considerable soft power by 
virtue of its relative economic strength, having 
become a net IMF contributor after repaying its 
last debt tranche in 2013 and being able to disburse 
humanitarian and development aid. Moreover, 
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Turkey has a popular culture that strikes a chord 
with people in many countries.
In this view, it is crucial that Turkey use its strong 
position in order to be a mediator that can commu-
nicate with a variety of actors through different 
channels. Turkey is most effective when it shows 
pragmatism and a will for compromise, and it 
avoids falling into the trap of following openly 
partisan politics. What makes Turkey so attractive 
to the outside world is not its imperial heritage 
but its very special mix of a modern and diverse 
society with a secular state and moderate Islam, 
economic success, and democracy – a country that 
geographically lies both in Europe and in Asia, 
shares a common history with the Middle East and 
Northern Africa, but at the same time is a member 
of NATO and the EU Customs Union.
As to opportunities for concrete cooperation in 
the region, I would like to focus on three priority 
areas. For one thing, there is Russia. We should 
closely coordinate our policies, be it on sanctions 
or on energy. The diversification of our energy 
supplies is vital for the resilience and the stability 
of our economic systems. Turkey aspires to become 
an energy hub for Europe. At the same time, it is 
highly dependent on energy imports, especially 
from Russia, which provide roughly two-thirds 
of gas consumed in Turkey. Our common goal 
must be not to destroy beneficial interdependence 
between suppliers such as Russia and consumers 
such as Turkey or Germany, but rather to reduce 
existing vulnerabilities. The more options there 
are the better. There is great potential for regional 
energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Together, we must work towards setting the right 
conditions for making use of this potential.
Second, there is the broader Black Sea region, with 
Ukraine and the countries of the Southern Caucasus, 
where there is an ongoing state and nation building 
effort. The Azeri-Armenian conflict is far from 
being resolved and could come back to the head-
lines if not properly managed. Turkey should use 
its influence on Baku to promote peaceful means of 
conflict resolution as well as the implementation of 
standards set by OSCE and the Council of Europe. 
We also encourage Turkey to continue normaliza-
tion efforts with Armenia, which had a promising 
start with the Zurich protocols in 2009 but have 
been suspended since 2010.
Third, we face a common challenge in the Middle 
East and Northern Africa. The war in Syria poses 
very concrete threats to Turkey, as shown by the 
hostage crisis with the Consulate General in Mosul 
and fights along the border, most recently in Tel 
Abyad. The great number of Syrian refugees in 
Turkey, over 2 million people by now, is a huge strain 
on the Turkish state. There may be differences 
between Turkey and Germany on which groups to 
support in Syria and in which way. But there are 
no easy answers, and probably no good options to 
choose from. However, one thing is clear: The fight 
against IS in Syria and Iraq must be a joint endeavor. 
Common action must be continued against foreign 
terrorist fighters. Beyond the immediate armed 
conflict, Germany and Turkey should also identify 
projects for institution building and civil society 
development in Syria and Iraq. 
The dossiers outlined will remain on our common 
agenda for the years to come. Now that the Strategic 
Dialogue between our countries has been elevated 
to the level of heads of state, there is an additional 
framework to discuss and prepare measures with 
which we can make a true difference in the region.
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T H E  A SY M M ET R I CA L  D E V E L O P M E N T  O F  P O L I T I CA L  A N D  EC O N O M I C 
R E L AT I O NS  B ET W E E N  T U R K E Y  A N D  T H E  E U
E b r u  Tu r h a n
Turkey presents a special case in the widening of the 
European Union (EU). Each enlargement round 
of the EU had its particularities. Yet, the Turkish 
accession process greatly differs from previous 
expansions of the EU. Still, a decade after Turkey 
began its accession talks, uncertainty remains 
whether it will ever join the Union as a full member. 
Only 14 out of 35 negotiation chapters have been 
opened throughout the 10 years of Turkey’s acces-
sion talks with the EU, while 17 remain blocked by 
the Council of the EU or two member states (France 
and Cyprus). Turkey’s crooked EU path is in fact 
the result of “cyclical trends” in European-Turkish 
relations.11 A typical pattern of EU-Turkish dialogue 
is usually marked by moments of intensive coopera-
tion followed by periods of crisis and conflict. 
Recently, however, the cyclical relationship between 
Turkey and the EU has been replaced by an apparent 
stalemate. Within the last five years of Turkey’s EU 
accession process, only two negotiation chapters 
[Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary, phytosanitary 
policy, and Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordi-
nation of structural instruments] have been opened. 
The accession talks on strategically important 
chapters related to issues such as energy, judiciary 
and fundamental rights, justice, and customs union 
are likely to remain blocked until positive and 
productive steps can be taken towards a permanent 
solution to the Cyprus conflict. The standstill in the 
Turkish reform process also obstructs the consistent 
11 Luigi Narbone and Nathalie Tocci, “Running around in circles? The 
cyclical relationship between Turkey and the European Union,” Jour-
nal of Southern Europe and Balkans 9, no. 3 (2007): 233-245.
continuation of accession talks. The European 
Commission’s (EC) 2014 Progress Report on Turkey 
raised concerns about the stability of democratic 
institutions and rule of law in Turkey. The docu-
ment particularly criticized serious shortcomings 
in Ankara’s response to corruption allegations and 
the independence, impartiality, and effectiveness of 
the judiciary.12 As for now, the new Commission does 
not provide explicit support for Turkish member-
ship in the EU. In his political guidelines, the new 
President of the EC, Jean-Claude Juncker, does not 
mention Turkey when it comes to the enlargement 
of the EU, instead placing strong emphasis on talks 
with the Western Balkans.13 This clearly signifies the 
new EC’s prioritization of EU enlargement into the 
Western Balkans over Turkish accession to the EU. 
While the political dialogue between Turkey and 
the EU has been rather icy over the past few years, 
economic relations between the two parties have 
continued without a significant hitch and have 
even gradually improved. The EU is by far Turkey’s 
most important trading partner; in 2014 Turkey 
remained the EU’s sixth largest trading partner 
with a total trade volume of €128 billion. In 2013, 
Turkey was the only country among the Union’s top 
ten trading partners that increased its exports to 
12 European Commission, Turkey 2014 Progress Report, COM (2014) 
700 final, October 8, 2014, Brussels.
13 Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, 
Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change: Political Guidelines for the 
Next Commission, Strasbourg, July 15, 2014, 11.
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the EU.14 Over the past five years, EU member states 
have accounted for about 75% of the total foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to Turkey. 
Turkey’s economic ties with Germany are 
particularly strong. Germany is Turkey’s most 
important trading partner and its biggest foreign 
direct investor, with the operations of around 
6,000 German companies or companies with 
German capital interest in Turkey. Various German 
companies manage their regional operations from 
Turkey, improving Turkey’s status as a regional 
business hub. The Eurozone crisis and the gath-
ering of clouds over Germany’s other key export 
markets have provided a window of opportunity 
for the enhancement of German-Turkish business 
relations. Germany’s interest in expanding the 
bilateral ties with Turkey in the crisis era has been 
demonstrated by the increasing number of German 
delegations composed of relevant ministers and 
high-level entrepreneurs who have visited Turkey. 
These visits also reflect the intensification of 
state-private sector dialogue in Germany to boost 
German-Turkish economic ties.
Looking at the status quo in EU-Turkish rela-
tions, it may seem at first sight that the stagnation 
of Turkey’s political integration into the EU, on 
the one hand, and steadily developing bilateral 
economic relations, on the other, may be tolerable 
for both parties. However, a closer look reveals 
that the asymmetrical development of political and 
economic relations between Turkey and the EU has 
already started to present important challenges for 
effective bilateral cooperation. 
EU negotiations with the United States over the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) reveal the implications of the deadlock in 
Turkey’s accession talks for bilateral economic 
14 “Extra-EU28 trade, by main partners, total product,” Eurostat, ac-
cessed May 25, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshT-
ableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tet00035&language=en. 
relations. In 1995, Turkey initiated the Customs 
Union (CU) with the EU, thereby passing its control 
over trade policies to the Union, predicting that it 
would soon become a full member state.15 The CU 
provides for common external tariffs allowing the 
countries that the EU signs preferential trade agree-
ments with to access the Turkish market without 
having to open up their own markets to Turkey. 
Since Turkey did not (and still has yet to) become 
a full member of the EU following its entrance into 
the CU, this has put the country in an unfavorable 
position in the global economic order. According 
to the calculations of the German Ifo Institute, 
an EU-U.S. free trade agreement would lead to a 
decrease in Turkish gross domestic product (GDP) 
by over 1.5%.16 Since Turkey’s automatic inclusion 
in TTIP without being a full member of the EU is 
fairly unlikely, Turkey and the EU agreed in May 
2015 to a road map to modernize and deepen the 
CU in order to minimize the short-term losses 
from TTIP and other future free trade agreements 
between the EU and third parties. 
The gradual enhancement of EU/German-Turkish 
economic relations, on the one hand, and the stagna-
tion of Turkey’s political integration into the EU, on 
the other, does not provide a sustainable status quo 
for both actors. The stalemate in Turkey’s EU acces-
sion talks has held negative implications for the 
maintenance of a stable political environment and 
for doing business in Turkey. The political turmoil 
during the Gezi Park protests revealed the strong 
tie between political and economic stability when 
the stock market witnessed the biggest daily drop 
in a decade and the Turkish lira weakened remark-
ably. Such incidents affected foreign companies’ 
business performance in Turkey. Consequently, 
the Federation of German Industries (BDI) warned 
15 Ebru Turhan and Erdal Yalçın, “Çok Vitesli Avrupa’ya Uyum Süre-
cinde Gümrük Birliği’nin Rolü,” TÜSIAD Görüş Dergisi, January 
2015, No. 86, 60-63.
16 Ibid. 
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Turkey about the economic implications of political 
instability.17 Economic and political stability greatly 
facilitates the influx of FDI. It should not come 
as a surprise that since the outbreak of domestic 
turmoil in Turkey in 2013, with Gezi events serving 
as a fundamental catalyst, there has been a decrease 
in the number of newly established German compa-
nies in Turkey each year (See Table 1).
Year Number of New German Companies in Turkey
2009 492
2010 468
2011 599
2012 491
2013 349
2014 338
Table 1: Number of companies with German 
capital established in mentioned year 
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, FDI Data 
Monthly Newsletters (2009-2014)
Turkish and European leaders should be mindful 
of both short and long-term consequences of 
the asymmetrical development of political and 
economic relations between Turkey and the EU 
and evaluate the Turkish-European relationship in 
view of changing systemic and institutional condi-
tions. The Eurozone crisis and European efforts 
to tackle the crisis through the implementation of 
structural reforms and the introduction of tighter 
regulations at the supranational level revealed 
that not all member states have been ready for 
and capable of putting the appropriate measures 
into practice. The latest statements of the EU and 
its member states indicate the tendency towards 
a multi-tier Europe founded on the principle of 
17 “Industrie beklagt ‘Kakophonie’ der Euro-Retter,” Handelsblatt, July 
3, 2012.
differentiated integration.18 Within the framework 
of this rather flexible integration model, Turkey’s 
gradual political and economic integration with 
the EU should continue, whereas a full Turkish 
membership in the EU shall remain a long-term 
goal and option. By implementing this political 
agenda, the EU could confirm that it still acts as a 
fundamental and credible anchor for democratic 
reform and consolidation in Turkey, on the one 
hand, and safeguard its economic interests, on the 
other.19
18 European Council, Conclusions of the European Council, 26-27 June 
2014, EUCO 79/14, Brussels, June 27, 2014, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143478.pdf. 
19 For a more detailed discussion on this topic please see Erdal Yalçın and 
Ebru Turhan, “Die Integration der Türkei in die EU am Scheideweg? 
Optionen für eine Vertiefung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im Zeichen 
von TTIP.“ Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 55, no. 3 (2015): 32-41.
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T U R K E Y ’ S  D I A S P O R A  P O L I C I E S  A N D  G E R M A N Y ’ S  T U R K S :  N O  F I F T H  C O LU M N, 
B U T  M U LT I P L E  T E NS I O NS
Ke r e m  Ö kt e m
Turkey’s diaspora policies have been in the making 
for a while. Since the first AKP government in 
2002, Turkish leaders have shown increasing 
interest in Turkish immigrant communities in 
Western Europe. It was not before the inauguration 
of the “Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related 
Communities” (henceforth “Presidency”) in 2010, 
however, that Turkey launched a concerted policy 
towards its expatriate citizens. This new interest 
in the “brothers and sisters” abroad has created 
new opportunity spaces for people related to the 
Republic of Turkey. It has also pushed Turks in 
Europe into a political space where homeland and 
country of residence interests are constantly being 
negotiated. Consequently, Turkey-related commu-
nities in Germany have become re-politicized in a 
fashion that has raised more than a few eyebrows 
among German decision makers and the general 
public. This brief explores the creation of the new 
political field of the Turkish diaspora. It does so by 
examining the origins of Turkey’s diaspora policy, 
the foundation of the Presidency, and by seeking to 
evaluate its impact on Turks in Germany.
Since the beginning of Turkish labor migration to 
Germany in the 1960s, Turkish state agencies have 
sought to control and shape the emerging commu-
nities there. Initially, they employed Turkish 
nationalist groups like the Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) for these aims. After the military coup 
of 1980, Turkish state policy shifted towards the 
creation of a Turkish-Islamic bond with the home-
land. It was the Presidency of Religious Affairs, 
the Diyanet, and its German organization, DITIB 
(Turkish Islamic Union of the Presidency of Reli-
gious Affairs), that were tasked with establishing 
this bond. 
The “Presidency of Turks abroad and related 
communities” is anything but a simple continu-
ation of this state policy. Earlier efforts had been 
implemented by Kemalist state elites that were less 
than sympathetic to Turkish labor migrants -whose 
mostly rural origins and relative conservatism they 
saw as a stain on the country’s Western self-image. 
The Presidency, however, was established under 
very different conditions and with two interrelated 
aims. It is a pet project of President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, at the time Prime Minister and leader of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Both 
have been successful in projecting a self-image 
crafted along conservative Muslim social values 
and pride in Ottoman history. In this “neo-
Ottoman” and Muslim self-image of Turkishness, 
Turkish communities abroad could be reimagined 
as both representatives of Turkish interests and as 
citizens who enjoy the full support of the Turkish 
Republic. This civilizational bonding exercise led to 
organic relations of mutual interest between parts 
of the Turkish community in Germany and the 
AKP government. It also created the conditions for 
another AKP policy: Harnessing the voter’s poten-
tial in the diaspora and benefiting from stronger 
support for the AKP abroad than in the homeland. 
This second goal has been the main reason for the 
swift introduction of extra-territorial voting in 
Europe and beyond. Such a step could have been 
construed as a commendable extension of Turkey’s 
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democratic space to its citizens abroad. This step, 
however, was driven by anything but democratic 
concerns: It was a clear attempt to consolidate 
power in Turkey by galvanizing Turks abroad 
through integrating them into the ruling party’s 
clientelist logic of mutual interest. 
While it is the AKP’s power politics that has led 
to the (partial) integration of Turks abroad into 
Turkey’s political space, this integration creates 
significant challenges for German decision makers. 
By reimagining Turks abroad as part of a political 
and cultural community with Turkey at its center, 
the diaspora approach is an immediate retaliation 
to German efforts at “integration” and inclusive 
citizenship. It would not be exaggerated to speak of 
a clash of “models of integration.” From a German 
point of view, this must be particularly frustrating, 
as the country has finally come around to a more 
sensible engagement with its many immigrant 
communities. As German immigration, identity, 
and citizenship politics are becoming modernized 
and globalized, a significant section of its largest 
immigrant community is being pulled back into the 
political field of a third country. And this is not just 
any political field but one of extreme political polar-
ization between its constituents. It ranges from the 
increasingly conservative and authoritarian AKP 
to the Kemalists of the Republican People’s Party, 
the gradually less ethno-nationalist pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Peoples’ Party (HDP) to the diehard 
nationalists of the MHP.
Yet, for Germany, as well as for Germany’s Turks, 
Turkey’s diaspora policies do not have to lead to the 
worst-case scenario of a “Turkish Fifth Column” 
in Europe, exemplified by the disquieting election 
appearances of Erdoğan in Germany and other 
EU countries (before the presidential election in 
2014 and the national elections in June 2015). It 
may even bear some potential for both. Firstly, the 
capacity of Turkey’s diaspora policy is limited and 
owes much to the power of symbolic mobilization. 
The Presidency has not even one hundred, much 
less a very motivated one hundred, employees 
loyal to Erdoğan. They are not only tasked with the 
organization of immigrant communities in Western 
Europe, but they also supply cultural services for 
Turkic people in Central Asia, mobilize Muslims 
in the Balkans, and administer tens of thousands 
of scholarships for foreign students in Turkey. 
Deprived of the now waning symbolic power of 
Erdoğan, the Presidency has begun to lose much 
of its appeal. As the AKP power project is facing a 
severe impasse, Turkey’s pull on Turks abroad is 
diminishing. More importantly, Turkey’s diaspora 
policy can also be taken as a reminder for German 
decision makers to continue to modernize the legal 
and societal conditions of an open society. A society 
that is proud of its diversity and able to provide 
a fair deal for all of its members does not have to 
be afraid of third party interventions. When this 
happens, Turkey’s diaspora policy in Germany will 
become a side story, no matter which political party 
constitutes the government in Ankara.20
20 For a more detailed discussion, please consult Kerem Öktem, Turkey’s 
New Diaspora Policy: The challenge of inclusivity, outreach and capac-
ity (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center 2014). It is also available online: 
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/14627_
KeremÖktenWEB.18.08.pdf. 
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E U - M E M B E R S H I P  CAUS E?
Ya şa r  Ayd ı n
In recent years, Turkish politicians have increas-
ingly intervened into political and social matters 
that concern Turks in Germany. The former Turkish 
prime minister, now President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan visited Germany several times and held 
speeches in which he condemned assimilation as 
a “crime against humanity,” calling on Turks not 
only to maintain their relationship with Turkey and 
Turkish culture but also to work in the interests of 
Turkey. As such, Erdoğan’s speeches and other high-
ranking Turkish politicians’ similar comments have 
caused friction in German-Turkish relations.
Ankara’s enhanced interest in Turkish migrants 
in Germany is part of a more deliberate diaspora 
policy: Turkey has categorized such a group as dias-
pora in order to pursue a strategy of establishing or 
maintaining permanent, institutionalized relation-
ships with migrants of Turkish decent in Europe, 
especially in Germany. Classifying the Turkish 
community in Germany and elsewhere in Europe as 
“diaspora” marks a clear break with the perception 
of Turkish migrants as “guest workers” who are only 
in Europe temporarily.
According to scientific literature, four distinguishing 
features constitute a diaspora, which are also char-
acteristic of migrants in Europe that originate from 
Turkey: 
a) Dispersion: spread of an ethnic group or citizens 
of a state beyond the territory of origin; 
b) Retrospection: ties of a migrant group to the 
country of origin and identification with it; 
c) Community spirit: collective experience of exclu-
sion and discrimination of a migrant group in the 
host country; 
d) Exterritoriality: a collective identity that is no 
longer necessarily tied to belonging to only a 
specific territorial area—be it the host country, 
the region of residence, or the country or region 
of origin.21
The presence of people originating from Turkey in 
Germany justifies the use of the term “diaspora,” as 
this group has an identity that can be distinguished 
from that of the majority of society. They maintain 
close and permanent relationships to Turkey and 
possess a high degree of organization. Although they 
have not been entirely included in the formation of 
public opinion in Germany, they are nevertheless 
now recognized as a primary target group – as elec-
tors and potential voters of special political parties – 
more so than in the past. However, this transnational 
diaspora in Germany is far from being homogeneous 
– either in culture, ethnicity, religion, or with respect 
to the spectrum of employment. The occupational 
positions of people of Turkish origin in Germany 
vary, from those working in highly qualified posi-
tions and entrepreneurs to those working 3D jobs.
The Turkish government aims at mobilizing the 
Turkish diaspora in order to achieve its political 
aspirations such as Turkey’s EU membership. The 
diaspora is intended to be a mouthpiece for the inter-
21 Helmuth Berking, “‘Homes away from Home’: Zum Spannungsver-
hältnis von Diaspora und Nationalstaat,” Berliner Journal für Soziolo-
gie, no. 1 (2000): 53.
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ests of Turkey. For this purpose, the Turkish govern-
ment encourages Turks to be well integrated in 
Germany, because only then can they have an impact 
on institutions such as political parties and associa-
tions and thus act as lobbyists for Turkey. Ankara is 
of the opinion that a poorly integrated community 
could have unfavorable effects for Turkey’s EU 
membership because it would produce a poor image 
of Turkey among the majority in German society.
From Ankara’s point of view, globalization is forcing 
Turkey to reposition itself in the web of international 
relations and to make use of the potential of Turkish 
migrants who are scattered across the world. There-
fore, Turkey will continue to focus its attention on 
the Turkish diaspora especially in Germany.
Why then is it often so difficult for Germany to make 
a balanced assessment of the interests of the Turkish 
government in regards to its Turkish migrants? First, 
it is due to the skepticism of many German decision 
makers towards the transnational connections of 
Turks in Germany, which are regarded as an obstacle 
to their integration into German society. Second, 
there are widespread concerns about the Turkish 
government exercising “externally controlled pene-
tration” of the Turkish diaspora in order to support 
the group. Third, in its judgment of “diaspora” and 
“diaspora policy” in general, numerous German 
decision makers are influenced by the specter of 
a “fifth column” or “Trojan horse.” Consequently, 
these decision makers are losing sight of the integra-
tive aspects of both the diaspora as a way of life and of 
Turkey’s diaspora policy. 
Additionally, Turkish diaspora policy attracts criti-
cism because it has become less inclusive over time. 
It is not willing or able to integrate migrant associa-
tions that have a critical attitude towards the Turkish 
governments’ domestic policies, such as the politi-
cized Kurds, Alevis, and the secular Turks. Further-
more, following the wave of protests in Turkey in 
2013, many Turkish migrant associations have lost 
interest in diaspora activities. Excessive use of force 
and violence by the police to remove the peaceful 
camping protesters from Gezi Park led to criticism 
of migrant associations in Germany and triggered 
its own wave of protest campaigns in Germany 
against the Turkish government. This increased the 
alienation of the secular oriented migrants from the 
Turkish government and, consequently, German 
skepticism of the Turkish diaspora policy. 
Turkey’s diaspora policy, furthermore, holds the 
danger of reinforcing cultural fragmentation within 
the diaspora in Germany—precisely because of 
its emphasis on conservative social and Turkish 
national values. This fragmentation has clearly put 
limits on the Turkish government’s attempts to 
intervene and control. Turkish diaspora policy and 
the rhetoric that accompanies it are thus no longer 
able to appeal to the cultural, ethnic, and religious 
diversity of the Turkish diaspora in Germany.
Therefore, Ankara should accept the autonomy 
of diaspora organizations, recognize the cultural 
and political diversity of the Turkish diaspora, and 
continue to support structural, social, and political 
integration and naturalization of Turks in Germany. 
Only then can Turkish diaspora policy function 
as leverage for Turkey’s EU membership cause. 
Otherwise, if the government continues supporting 
a cultural-ethnically oriented national identity 
(Muslim Nationalism, Muslim Turkishness) or 
conservative social ethics, it can act as an obstacle 
to membership: Contributing to the reinforcement 
of anti-Turkey attitudes and even creating conflicts 
between the Turkish diaspora and their host coun-
tries.22
22 Further reading: Yaşar Aydın, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy: Its 
Aims, Their Limits and the Challenges for Associations of People of 
Turkish Origin and Decision-makers in Germany (SWP: Berlin, Oc-
tober 2014), http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-re-
search-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/neue_tuerkische_
diasporapolitik.html.
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E U R O P E  CA N  A L S O  D E A L  W I T H  A  C O NS E RVAT I V E  M US L I M  T U R K E Y
G ü n t e r  S e u f e r t
For Turkey’s former elite, Western European 
countries functioned as political (nation-state) and 
cultural (secularization) models. As far as security 
policy was concerned, the connection to Europe and 
the West seemed the only option. As a result, Turkey 
occupied a position at the edge of Europe, not only 
in territorial but also in cultural and political terms. 
This status was rejected by former foreign minister 
and current prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who 
invoked powerful images of the Turks’ own tradition 
and civilization and of the history of the Ottoman 
Empire. For him, this period in which Turkey was 
reduced to a factor in the policies of the West and, 
thus, culturally and politically marginalized was 
just one episode in the history of the country that 
had to come to an end sooner or later. Today, this 
assessment is shared by a new and aspiring economic 
elite, by the overwhelming majority of foreign policy 
experts, and by large swathes of the population. 
The political, social, and economic developments that 
have contributed so decisively to the establishment of 
this new normality within Turkey appear irreversible. 
This applies equally to the collapse of the republican 
security paradigm, whose constituent foreign and 
domestic policy components have now ceased to exist. 
Important events in this context include the end of the 
Cold War and the elimination of taboos surrounding 
central domestic threat scenarios, namely “reac-
tionary Islamism” and “Kurdish separatism.” This 
also applies to the weakening of Kemalism, the former 
state ideology, and the resultant delegitimization 
of extra-parliamentary veto powers of the military, 
political bureaucracy, and supreme judiciary. 
Like the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
itself, the ambitious entrepreneurial elite and new 
pool of foreign policy experts financed by it embody 
the socio-conservative population’s successful 
integration within politics, the economy, and educa-
tional establishments. For decades, the old Kemalist 
establishment blocked political participation by 
this section of Turkish society. Socio-conservative 
members of the population are united by a felt exclu-
sion, which exceeds the limits of class and region. 
This experience also spawned a political discourse 
that presents an alternative to Kemalism and rejects 
cultural Westernization dictated from above just as 
vehemently as a foreign and security policy connec-
tion to the West that apparently brooks no alternative. 
The encounter between the political, economic, 
and educational integration of the religious, socio-
conservative population and processes of economic 
and cultural globalization enabled this milieu’s elites 
to redefine their stance on modernism and present 
themselves as supporters of an alternative moder-
nity. Their previous knee-jerk rejection of West-
ernization and connecting to the West (including 
EU membership) has now been replaced by a self-
assured strategy that perceives Turkey as a potential 
regional center and comprehends the country’s own 
pace of development in the context of global change. 
Those who cling to this view assume that sustained 
economic success, as well as its contribution to 
an initial alteration in the grave development gap 
between the affluent West and the languishing East 
of the country, is the most important confirmation of 
the new strategy’s validity. 
Approval of the new foreign policy’s fundamental 
parameters in Turkey’s society extends far beyond 
the AKP’s electorate. This is underlined by the new 
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foreign policy’s compatibility with an explicitly 
nationalistic stance and refers to a series of conflicts 
between the former republican elite, the EU, and the 
United States. 
What are the consequences for the European Union? 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union and a 
number of its member states, on the one side, and 
with the United States, on the other, are affected 
in quite different ways. Notwithstanding the stir 
created by Turkey’s policies in Iraq, Syria, and Israel, 
its relationship with the United States appears to 
have been less affected by the realignment of Turkish 
foreign policy than its ties with the European Union. 
Military and security policy concerns have always 
been at the root of the Turkish-American cooperation, 
which is strongly interest-driven. Although major 
crises are possible, political about-turns often smooth 
things out. In addition, the United States is reliant on 
the existence of a strong Turkey in the region in the 
wake of modest success in regards to its Near and 
Middle East policies over the past decade. From the 
U.S. perspective, only a strong Turkey can play a useful, 
strategic role in the region and act as an indispensable 
political and military ally in crisis centers like Syria, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan. Turkey’s immense significance 
in the United States gives Ankara considerable 
political leeway as far as Washington is concerned. 
And Ankara uses this freedom when shaping its rela-
tions with Israel and Russia, doing so in a manner that 
partially contradicts U.S. perceptions and interests 
yet fails to seriously threaten the strategic collabora-
tion between Ankara and Washington. 
In contrast, Turkey’s relations with the European 
Union and several major EU member states are in 
far poorer shape. Turkey’s relationship with Europe 
has always been ambivalent. From the outset of the 
Republic onwards, the relationship is marked as 
greatly by resistance to European influence in the 
Middle East and mistrust of European attempts 
at democratization in Turkey itself as it is by the 
vision to become part of Europe in terms of culture 
and civilization, as well as in terms of economic and 
security policy. 
The paralyzed state of Turkey’s EU accession process 
and simultaneous consolidation of the hegemony 
enjoyed by the new religious socio-conservative elite 
threaten to undermine the vision of Turkey’s Euro-
peanization both in terms of foreign and security 
policy, as well as its vision of civilization, while they 
concomitantly strengthen the “negative” aspects 
of relations with Europe, which are characterized 
by foreign policy competition, cultural alienation, 
and domestic mistrust. Economic and technical 
exchanges with Europe remain the most powerful 
unifying element and essential corrective factor 
against a continued deterioration in relations. Their 
significance for Turkey is still considerable. However, 
the European Union’s influence is dwindling in this 
area, too, in proportion to the influence of newly 
emerging powers. 
The Cyprus conflict and the renewed securitization 
of Turkish foreign policy in the context of Iraq and 
Syria are issues ideally suited to provoke a further 
decline in EU-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, 
Turkey remains the regional player closest to Europe, 
particularly in the Middle Eastern context, that is 
simultaneously capable of exercising the most posi-
tive influence within the region 
As a result, European politics would be well advised 
to seize the opportunity offered by the more philo-
sophical stance currently adopted by the Turkish 
leadership and population regarding their country’s 
admission to the European Union. Precisely because 
Turkey is no longer seeking membership at any cost, 
the obstacles impeding the progress of accession 
negotiations, which are rooted in the domestic poli-
cies of several EU states, should now be navigable. 
Nothing would counteract the pervasively cultur-
alistic interpretation of personal identity in Turkey 
more effectively than a revisitation of the grounds for 
the categorical rejection of Turkish membership by 
some governments in EU member states. 
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